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"Be home by 10:00 p.m.!" is normally commanded of children
by parents, not the law. However, while the thought of a
modern-day town imposing a curfew instead of a parent may
alarm people, many towns and counties do currently impose
juvenile curfews.1 The Second and Ninth Circuits have struck
down such curfews, 2 while the Fourth and District of Columbia
* J.D. Candidate, June 2007, St. John's University School of Law; B.A. Political Science,
magna cum laude, Seton Hall University, May 2004. The author wishes to thank
Professor Ruescher for his help with this Note and Brittony Hubbard for all her support.
1 Curfews have been around for centuries and were brought over to the United States
from England. See Thistlewood v. Ocean City, 204 A.2d 688, 690 (Md. 1964). Curfews
were used in America to control slaves before the Civil War. See id. By the year 1997, 80%
of communities with a population of over 300,000 had some form of juvenile curfew. See
Note, Juvenile Curfews and the Major Confusion over Minor Rights, 118 HARV. L. REV.
2400, 2403 (2005) [hereinafter Juvenile Curfews and the Major Confusion].
2 See Ramos v. Town of Vernon, 353 F.3d 171, 187 (2d Cir. 2003) (determining that
juvenile curfew ordinance was unconstitutional because it infringed on juveniles' equal
protection rights); see also Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 951-952 (9th Cir.
1997) (holding defendant city's juvenile curfew ordinance was unconstitutional because
ST JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 21:3
Circuits have upheld such ordinances. 3 This note seeks to
analyze the history and legality of juvenile curfews by cataloging
the different and contradictory positions of the circuit courts.
Section I will describe the meaning and purpose of curfews and
briefly describe current curfews. Section II will introduce the
legal issues involved and challenges made to those curfews and
then discuss how circuits have split in deciding on these issues
and challenges. Section III will catalog the early case law, and
Section IV will analyze the recent case of Hutchins v. District of
Columbia,4 examining the legal issues involved. Section V will
offer resolutions for the discrepancies in the case law.
I. WHAT ARE JUVENILE CURFEWS?
A. The History and Birth of Juvenile Curfews
"Curfew" has been defined as "an order establishing a specific
time in the evening after which certain regulations apply .... 5
The primary purpose of imposing curfews is to maintain social
order.6 As such, curfews have a long history of being used as
controlling devices. 7 Even before the Civil War, slave-owners
prohibited slaves from being outside or leaving their barracks
ordinance was vague and not narrowly tailored to justify burdening minors' rights of free
movement and speech as well as parents' rights to rear their children).
3 See Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531, 534 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (en banc)
(plurality opinion) (upholding juvenile curfew ordinance as constitutional against
heightened scrutiny); see also Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville, 159 F.3d 843, 855 (4th
Cir. 1998) (finding juvenile curfew ordinance constitutional because it was narrowly
tailored to serve legitimate state interest by providing various exceptions that enabled
children to participate in necessary activities during the curfew hours); Lindsay LaCava,
Note, Ramos v. Town of Vernon: Second Circuit Weighs in on Juvenile Curfew Debate, 23
QUINNIPIAc L. REV. 1197, 1197 (2005) (discussing circuit split).
4 188 F.3d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (en banc) (plurality opinion).
5 Dictionary.com, http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=curfew (last visited Nov. 1,
2006).
6 See Kenneth Adams, Research Findings from Prevention and Intervention Studies:
The Effectiveness of Juvenile Curfews at Crime Prevention, 587 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. &
Soc. SCI. 136, 136 (2003) (asserting "[c]urfews... have been used throughout history as a
provisional measure to control civil disorder and unrest"); see also Juvenile Curfews and
the Major Confusion, supra note 1, at 2402 (noting during nineteenth century, children
were threatening social order).
7 See Thistlewood v. Ocean City, 204 A.2d 688, 690 (Md. 1964) (explaining nearly
thousand-year history and controlling uses of curfews); see also Juvenile Curfews and the
Major Confusion, supra note 1, at 2402 (commenting that curfews were imposed partly to
control juveniles who were "failing to mature into proper citizens").
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past certain hours. 8 In those situations, curfews were used to
sustain dominance and keep order among the slaves. 9 Other
historical ways in which curfews were used were to punish,lO to
control rebellion,ll and to protect citizens in emergencies, 12
including wars13 and riots.14
Although the use of curfews is not a new device, it was not
until the late nineteenth century that curfew legislation aimed at
juveniles gained support and popularity.15 In the late 1890s, over
three thousand communities had implemented juvenile
8 See Thistlewood, 204 A.2d at 690 (stating before Civil War, southern towns enacted
curfew laws designating times slaves could lawfully walk streets); see also Patryk J.
Chudy, Doctrinal Reconstruction: Reconciling Conflicting Standards in Adjudicating
Juvenile Curfew Challenges, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 518, 523-24 (2000) (providing variety of
contexts in which curfew laws have been utilized, including keeping African Americans off
streets at night).
9 See Thistlewood, 204 A.2d at 690 (noting juvenile curfews did not become popular
until latter nineteenth century); Chudy, supra note 8, at 523 (explaining pre-Civil War
legislators used curfews to restrict African Americans' freedom of movement).
10 See Critical Resistance, http://www.criticalresistance
.org/index.php?name=oaklandaction (last visited Nov. 1, 2006) (seeking supporters to
fight curfews for probationers); see also Federal Probation, Electronic Monitoring: Positive
Intervention Strategies, http://www.uscourts.gov/fedprob/
jun2005/intervention.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2006) (highlighting newest method of
enforcing judicially imposed curfews is by electronic monitoring).
11 Between the years of 1066 and 1087, William the Conqueror implemented a curfew
for all Englishmen in order to prevent the Saxons from assembling and rebelling. See
Thistlewood, 204 A.2d at 690; see also Adams, supra note 6, at 137. The word curfew
originated from the French words couvre feu, which translates to "covering fire." See
Thistlewood, 204 A.2d at 690. Curfews originally required individuals to cover their home-
fires at a certain time for protection throughout the night. See id. However, William the
Conqueror used it to prevent the gathering of English on the streets. See id.
12 See Smith v. Avino, 91 F.3d 105, 109 (11th Cir. 1996) (stating authorities must be
given deference when a curfew is imposed as an emergency measure in response to a
natural disaster); see also State v. Dobbins, 178 S.E.2d 449, 456 (N.C. 1971) (upholding
curfew imposed during an imminent threat of widespread burning and destruction of
property).
13 See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 83 (1943) (regarding curfew order
imposed on persons of Japanese ancestry within prescribed military area during World
War II); see also Rich Jahn, Analysis of U.S. Curfew Laws, National Youth Rights
Association, http://www.youthrights.
org/curfewana.shtml (last visited Nov. 1, 2006) (providing examples of curfews used in
emergency situations such as riots).
14 In re Juan C., 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 919, 920 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (upholding curfew
ordinance that was imposed in response to widespread looting and rioting); see also
Thistlewood, 204 A.2d at 690-91 (recounting Anglo-American history of curfew laws).
15 See Thistlewood, 204 A.2d at 690. By the end of the Nineteenth Century, about
three 3,000 American communities had juvenile curfews in their municipal ordinances.
See id. at 690-91. The first juvenile curfew was in Omaha, Nebraska in 1880. Adams,
supra note 6, at 137. In 1897, the Boys and Girls National Home and Employment
Association recommended that states enact juvenile curfews. See id.
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curfews. 16 The early curfews generally required children to be
home by sunset. 17 The reason cited for having juvenile curfews
was to prevent children from engaging in criminal activity or
from becoming victims of crime.18 Communities thought the
sunset curfews worked well,19 and those curfews remained
popular until the start of World War 1.20 During World War I,
however, instead of focusing on the protection of children and the
cessation of crime, the United States turned all its efforts to
fighting the war.21 Then, during World War II, states once again
began implementing juvenile curfews. 22 The purpose of these
curfews was to make up for the absence of parents who were
either in the service or working during the night in war plants. 23
Though parents today are not faced with wartime scenarios,
juvenile curfews continue to grow in popularity.24
16 See ANDRA J. BANNISTER ET AL., POLICIES AND PRACTICES RELATED TO JUVENILE
CURFEWS 4 (2000) (highlighting that, by nineteenth century's end, "it was estimated that
as many as 3,000 towns, cities, and villages had implemented some form of curfew
ordinance"); see also Jeff A. Beaumont, Nunez and Beyond: An Examination of Nunez v.
City of San Diego and the Future of Nocturnal Juvenile Curfew Ordinances, 19 J. JUV. L.
84, 89 (1998) (explaining juvenile crime was why juvenile curfews gained support).
17 See BANNISTER, supra note 16, at 5 (arguing children should be required to be in
their homes after sunset); see also Juvenile Curfews and the Major Confusion, supra note
1, at 2403 (noting America effectively closed streets to minors during nighttime).
18 See BANNISTER, supra note 16, at 4 (commenting that there are many reasons why
communities implement juvenile curfews); see also Richard T. Ford, Juvenile Curfews and
Gang Violence: Exiled on Main Street, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1693, 1698-99 (1994)
(suggesting criminal activity targeted is gang related).
19 See Thistlewood, 236 A.2d at 690-91 (noting high level of support given to juvenile
curfew legislation); see also BANNISTER, supra note 16, at 4 (describing popularity of
National Home Employment Association's proposal for sunset curfews in the late
nineteenth century).
20 See Thistlewood, 236 A.2d at 691 (highlighting public's brief lack of interest in
juvenile curfew ordinances following the First World War); see also BANNISTER, supra
note 16, at 4 (discussing possible reasons for early nineteenth century demise of curfew
ordinances).
21 See Thistlewood, 236 A.2d at 691 (discussing waning interest in curfews
throughout World War I); see also BANNISTER, supra note 16, at 4 (proposing Great
Depression and Prohibition were additional reasons why curfews remained unpopular
until World War II's end).
22 See BANNISTER, supra note 16, at 5 (discussing post-World War II renewed interest
in curfews); see also Juvenile Curfews and the Major Confusion, supra note 1, at 2403
(explaining "absence of parents due to military service or wartime late-shifts resulted in a
perceived lack of control over children").
23 See BANNISTER, supra note 16, at 4 (discussing how youth crime and misconduct
took a backseat to new national priority of war); see also Juvenile Curfews and the Major
Confusion, supra note 1, at 2403 (noting significant increase in popularity of juvenile
curfews during war).
24 See Adams, supra note 6, at 137-38 (evaluating curfews' use during 1990s as crime
control measure); see also Juvenile Curfews and the Major Confusion, supra note 1, at
2403 (reporting growing prevalence of curfews in large cities).
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B. Current Juvenile Curfews
In the late 1990s, over 70% of the nation's 200 largest
communities had some form of juvenile curfew. 25 The curfews
normally prohibit minors, who are individuals under either
seventeen or eighteen years of age, 26 from being on the streets
from 11 p.m. to 6 a.m. during the week and from 12 a.m. to 6 a.m.
on weekends.27 They do, however, contain narrow exceptions. 28
These narrow exceptions include emergencies, errands, and work
or school-related travel. 29 Though many reasons are cited for
imposing curfews, 30 the most prominent reason is their use as a
crime control strategy.31 However, the use of curfews as an
effective control strategy has sparked debate.32 On the one hand,
those who favor curfews argue that curfews do in fact prevent
25 See Adams, supra note 6, at 137 (listing curfew law survey results for cities across
North America); see also Juvenile Curfews and the Major Confusion, supra note 1, at 2403
(highlighting that, by 1997, 80% of communities with populations over 30,000 had
curfews).
26 See Gregory Z. Chen, Note, Youth Curfews and the Trilogy of Parent, Child, and
State Relations, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 131, 135 (1997) (reporting Dallas curfew applied to
individuals under seventeen years of age); Juvenile Curfews and the Major Confusion,
supra note 1, at 2403 (noting traditional applicability of curfews to individuals younger
than either seventeen or eighteen).
27 See Thistlewood v. Ocean City, 204 A.2d 688, 691 (Md. 1964) (stating there are two
types of juvenile curfews: (1) "presence," in which it is forbidden to be on street after
specified time; and (2) "remaining," or "loitering," in which violation is against loitering or
gathering); see also Juvenile Curfews and the Major Confusion, supra note 1, at 2403-04
(proffering "curfews forbid unaccompanied minors.., from being in public spaces late at
night, usually between 11 p.m. and 6 a.m. during the week, and midnight and 6 a.m. on
weekends").
28 See Chen, supra note 26, at 135-36 (describing how curfews started as bans on
nearly all youth nighttime activities, but exceptions were created to help policies survive
judicial scrutiny); see also Juvenile Curfews and the Major Confusion, supra note 1, at
2404 (noting there are usually exceptions enumerated, allowing minors to violate curfew
laws under certain circumstances).
29 See Ramos v. Town of Vernon, 353 F.3d 171, 172 (2d Cir. 2003) (enumerating
exceptions included in Vernon's curfew ordinance); see also Juvenile Curfews and the
Major Confusion, supra note 1, at 2404 (listing typical exceptions to curfew laws);
LaCava, supra note 3, at 1199 (detailing exceptions to Vernon's juvenile curfew law).
30 See Adams, supra note 6, at 138-39 (examining sources of juvenile curfews'
contemporary popularity); Ford, supra note 18, at 1698-99 (citing arguments supporting
curfew implementation in Hartford and other cities).
31 See Adams, supra note 6, at 138-39 (referring to several arguments in favor of
curfews that center around crime control); see Ford, supra note 18, at 1698-99 (explaining
how supporters of Hartford's curfew policy cite added weapon given to police to "detain
suspicious youth and preempt potentially criminal activity" as important crime control
function rationalizing curfew's preservation).
32 See Ford, supra note 18, at 1698 (presenting both sides of the curfew policy debate);
see also Juvenile Curfews and the Major Confusion, supra note 1, at 2404-05 (discussing
common criticisms of modern curfew policies and denouncing them as unconvincing).
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crime and make the community safer at a low cost.33 On the
other hand, those who oppose the curfews argue that juvenile
curfews do not work because they do not prevent crime 34 and are
only an intrusion into private family life.35 Several studies have
been conducted regarding the effectiveness of the curfews. 36
Although there are some studies that have found a correlation
between crime and curfews, 37 the vast majority of research
proves that curfews are not effective tools in controlling juvenile
crime.38
33 See Adams, supra note 6, at 139 (recognizing curfew implementation as possible
low cost remedy to juvenile crime problems); see also Bridget Remington, Recent
Development, Constitutional Law: First Amendment: Privacy, State v. J.P., 907 So.2d
1101 (Fla. 2004), 35 STETSON L. REV. 641, 644 (2006) (describing how court found
decrease in crime to be caused by Pinella Park curfew based on state's statistical
evidence, but struck down curfew because it did not pass strict scrutiny).
34 See BANNISTER, supra note 16, at 6 (conceding that curfews and crime rates have
no meaningful statistic relationship according to multiple studies conducted in the area
between 1984 and 1998); see also Adams, supra note 6, at 144 (stating that "research fails
to demonstrate that curfews produce a decrease in juvenile crime"); Juvenile Curfews and
the Major Confusion, supra note 1, at 2405 (stating that critics of juvenile curfews often
attack them as ineffective crime prevention mechanisms).
35 See Ford, supra note 18, at 1699 (emphasizing how curfews force law-abiding
families to rearrange their daily lives and forfeit certain personal freedoms they would
otherwise be entitled to); see also, Juvenile Curfew Ordinances and the Constitution, 76
MICH L. REV. 109, 132-37 (1977) [hereinafter Ordinances and the Constitution]
(admitting that family rights are infringed upon, but arguing that governmental interests
in protecting community from juvenile crime, protecting minors from harm, and
reinforcing parental authority outweigh those rights).
36 See BANNISTER, supra note 16, at 6 (discussing various studies conducted
regarding curfew laws' effects and their findings); see also Adams, supra note 6, at 141-47
(evaluating ten different studies conducted about effectiveness of juvenile curfews
throughout America).
37 See BANNISTER, supra note 16, at 6 (stating that "[a] myriad of communities claim
to have experienced wide success in reducing crime through the use of juvenile curfew
ordinances" and discussing Hunt and Weiner study in 1977, which found Detroit's curfew
to be effective in suppressing and displacing crime); see also Catherine Hutton, Curfews
on Youths will be Tightened, WAIKATO TIMES, March 6, 2003, at 3. But see Adams, supra
note 6, at 148-49 (examining "counterintuitive" findings of various studies that actually
found positive correlations between curfew implementation and increased crime).
38 See Adams, supra note 6, at 141-47 (assessing various studies on juvenile curfews
and concluding that findings suggest curfews are ineffective crime prevention measures);
see also The Impact of Juvenile Curfew Laws in California, Center on Juvenile and
Criminal Justice, http://www.cjcj.org/pubs/curfew/curfew.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2006)
(evaluating curfew laws in California and concluding that "current available data
provides no basis to the belief that curfew laws are an effective way for communities to
prevent youth crime and keep young people safe").
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II. THE LEGAL ISSUES AND THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
A. The Legal Issues
Not only is there a debate over the effectiveness of curfews, 39
but curfews also raise several legal issues, and circuits are split
on how many of those legal issues are resolved.40 The first and
most complicated legal issue courts must resolve is whether
curfews violate minors' rights. 41 Historically, courts analyzed
juvenile curfews as infringing on the parents' rights to control
their children, not on the minors' personal rights.42 Today, courts
do agree that some minors' right is being infringed,43 but exactly
what right that is has sparked a difference of opinion among the
circuits.44 The second legal issue courts must decide is whether
39 Compare Adams, supra note 6, at 144 (concluding that curfews by themselves are
ineffective means to decrease crime), and Stacey Stowe, Town to Fight Curfew Ruling,
N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2003, at 6, with BANNISTER, supra note 16, at 6 (stating "myriad of
communities claim to have experienced wide success in reducing crime through the use of
juvenile curfew ordinances" and discussing Hunt and Weiner study in 1977 which found
Detroit's curfew to be effective in suppressing and displacing crime).
40 See BANNISTER, supra note 16, at 4 (describing various unsettled questions in area
of juvenile curfew laws); Juvenile Curfews and the Major Confusion, supra note 1, at
2413-15 (outlining approaches taken by various circuit courts in scrutinizing curfew laws
since 1975 and emphasizing differences in opinion reflected in courts' decisions).
41 See Brian Privor, Dusk 'Til Dawn: Children's Rights and the Effectiveness of
Juvenile Curfew Ordinances, 79 B.U. L. REV. 415, 439 (1999) (noting that states must be
careful to avoid "naked restrictions on children's liberty" and instead must further
legitimate interests if they want to enforce curfews); see also William Ruefle & Kenneth
Mike Reynolds, Keep Them at Home: Juvenile Curfew Ordinances in 200 American Cites,
15 AM. J. POLICE 63, 67 (1996), available at http://www.
emeralinsight.comfInsightfViewContentServlet?Filename=/publishedlemeraldabstractonI
yarticle
/pdf/1800150104.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2006) (suggesting open questions associated with
curfew policy debate including scope of youths' rights and government's ability to
constitutionally restrict those rights).
42 See Chen, supra note 26, at 140 (commenting on how courts reviewed minors'
rights cases as infringing on parents' right to raise their children); see also Privor, supra
note 41, at 448-49 (explaining how early courts analyzed juvenile curfews based on
parents' right to raise their children).
43 See Ramos v. Town of Vernon, 353 F.3d 171, 172 (2d Cir. 2003) (stating judiciary
must balance right to free movement and equal protection given to all citizens, including
juveniles, under Constitution, with state's interest in protecting children and decreasing
crime); see also Juvenile Curfews and the Major Confusion, supra note 1, at 2409 (noting
"no circuit has rejected the existence of a right" when dealing with children's rights in
curfew cases).
44 In Juvenile Curfews and the Major Confusion, the author discusses how the federal
courts of appeals have had difficulty in defining the rights of juveniles involved in curfew
cases. See Juvenile Curfews and the Major Confusion, supra note 1, at 2408-09. The
Ninth Circuit, in Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 1997), also claimed
the right involved is merely the broad right to free movement, while the District of
2007]
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the right cited by the court should be protected with the same
vigor as if the court were dealing with an adult.4 5 The third and
most critical legal issue that must be decided is which level of
scrutiny to apply to the curfew. 46 Finally, once all other legal
issues are resolved, the court must then apply the constitutional
level of scrutiny it decided should govern and identify what
interests the government may have in imposing such curfews.47
B. What Rights are Raised when Juvenile Curfews are
Challenged?
Today, challengers of juvenile curfews argue that many
constitutional rights are being violated by the curfews. 48 Among
the constitutional rights cited are those contained in the First,49
Fourth,50 and Fourteenth Amendments, 51 including the right to
Columbia Circuit, in Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531, 538 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
(en banc) (plurality opinion), stated it must be careful to discuss the asserted right more
narrowly because the broader the right, the easier to find protection for it.
45 See LaCava, supra note 3, at 1231 (analyzing juvenile curfews and noting that a
major issue is to decide if a minor is going to be treated the same way as an adult); see
generally Ramos v. Town of Vernon, 353 F.3d 171, 176 (2003) (taking on the issue of
whether children's rights are impacted by their age).
46 See Chen, supra note 26, at 150 (discussing how courts have not been able to decide
what level of scrutiny to apply); see also LaCava, supra note 3, at 1230 (noting that courts
need to determine what standard of review to apply when deciding whether rights have
been violated or not).
47 See Ramos, 353 F.3d at 172 (asserting "constitutionality of a curfew is determined
by balancing the recognized interests the state has in protecting children and fighting
crime against the constitutional right of all citizens, including juveniles, to move about
freely"); see also LaCava, supra note 3, at 1232 (stating that courts need to determine
whether freedom of movement in curfew cases is something with which the states can
"interfere").
48 See Ramos, 353 F.3d at 173 (providing an example of a plaintiff who claimed that
the curfew violated his equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and his
right to free speech and association under the First Amendment); see also Schleifer v. City
of Charlottesville, 159 F.3d 843, 846 (4th Cir. 1998) (analyzing the case of a plaintiff who
claimed that the curfew violated his First, Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights).
49 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for redress
or grievances.
Id.
50 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and




travel. 52 Plaintiffs argue that their First Amendment rights of
free speech and association are being violated because they are
forbidden from being allowed on the streets at night. 53 For
example, in Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville,54 the plaintiffs
unsuccessfully argued that their First Amendment right to
association was being violated because they were unable to
rollerblade with their friends during curfew hours. 55
Furthermore, in People v. Chambers,56 the juvenile plaintiffs
made the ineffective contention that their rights to free
association and assembly were being violated by a curfew
because they were not allowed to choose when and where to
associate.57
Another less common challenge made by plaintiffs is that the
curfews violate the Fourth Amendment's guarantee to be free
from unlawful searches and seizures. 58 The plaintiffs in Ramos v.
Vernon 59 and Waters v. Barry60 both argued that the juvenile
curfews imposed by their communities violated their Fourth
Id.
51 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Id.
52 See Privor, supra note 41, at 427-28 (mentioning curfew cases are usually brought
under First, Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth amendments); see also Danny R. Veilleux,
Validity, Construction, and Effect of Juvenile Curfew Regulations, 83 A.L.R.4th 1056, at
*2a (1991) (noting that success of challenge depends on judicial analysis of whatever
constitutional right is involved).
53 See Ramos, 353 F.3d at 173 (stating that Ramos claimed his Fourteenth
Amendment rights were violated because he was not allowed out late even with his
mother's permission); see also Veilleux, supra note 52, at *6a (commenting about courts
having "recogniz[ed] that curfews which prohibit the presence of a minor on the streets
after a certain hour have been held unconstitutional as an overly broad restriction on
minors' liberty interests and First Amendment activities... ").
54 992 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Va. 1997), affd, 159 F.3d 843 (4th Cir. 1998).
55 See Schleifer, 992 F. Supp. at 828.
56 360 N.E.2d 55 (Ill. 1976).
57 See Chambers, 360 N.E.2d at 56.
58 See Privor, supra note 41, at 427-28 (discussing the wide array of constitutional
challenges to juvenile curfew laws, including those based on the Fourth Amendment);
Ramos, 353 F.3d at 173 (providing an example of a Fourth Amendment challenge to a
juvenile curfew law).
59 353 F.3d 171 (2d Cir. 2003).
60 711 F. Supp. 1125 (D.D.C. 1989).
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Amendment rights because the curfews exposed the minors to
unreasonable stopping and detainment by law enforcement. 61
The Ramos court decided not to deal with the Fourth
Amendment challenge, 62 while the Waters court found that the
curfew did not violate the minor's Fourth Amendment rights so
long as the officer could reasonably believe that the individual
looked young.63
Though not made very often today, a challenge which retains
its importance and relevance is the argument that curfews
infringe on the parents' right to rear their children.64 The right to
rear your child is a right that has a strong basis in the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence. 65 The Supreme Court has noted that the
parental role is an important part of the "structure of our
society."66 Parents argue that juvenile curfews strip them of the
power to control their children's behavior and violate their rights
of privacy and autonomy. 67 For example, in Qutb v. Strauss,68
parents claimed that the Dallas curfew took away their right to
control their children and set curfews of their own. 69 The court in
61 See Ramos, 353 F.3d at 173; see also Waters, 711 F. Supp. at 1132.
62 Ramos, 353 F.3d at 172 (finding town ordinance infringed upon minor's equal
protection right, court did not further analyze Fourth Amendment issue).
63 See Waters, 711 F. Supp. at 1132-33.
64 See Johnson v. City of Opelousas, 658 F.2d 1065, 1074 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding
while city "may have legitimate concern over minors being on the streets at night in
general," it is insufficient to remove parental decisions as to activities of their children);
see also Allen v. City of Bordentown, 524 A.2d 478, 487 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1987)
(concluding city ordinance interfered with parents' rights to control their children's use of
streets and right of parents to have their children exercise their own rights); Chen, supra
note 26, at 157 (highlighting argument that youth curfew restrictions strip parents of
power to control their children's behavior).
65 See generally Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (emphasizing
importance of parents' rights to send their children school of their choice, was trespassed
upon by Oregon statute that had tried to regulate such choices); see also Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923) (finding legislature had materially interfered with
parents' authority to control their children's education); see also Chen, supra note 26, at
157-59 (noting how United States Supreme Court opinions regarding parental autonomy
influenced circuit and state court opinions).
66 Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968); see also Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (stating "[iut is cardinal with us that the custody, care and
nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom
include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder").
67 See Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488, 495 (5th Cir. 1993) (demonstrating the parents'
argument that the city's curfew violates their right to privacy because it "dictates the
manner in which their children must be raised"); Chen, supra note 26, at 157 (discussing
parents' claim that their right of autonomy and privacy is violated when they lose ability
to rear their own children).
68 11 F.3d 488 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1127 (1994).
69 Qutb, 11 F.3d at 495-96.
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Qutb found that such intrusion was minimal at best and that it
only took away the parents' right to allow their minor children to
remain unaccompanied in public places at night. 70 This narrow
tailoring of such right allowed the court to bypass the parents'
challenge. 71 Although the parents' challenge is an important one,
many courts, such as Qutb, bypass the question of parental rights
and fail to address the issue.72
A final and very important challenge to juvenile curfews is
made by asserting that minors have a right to intrastate travel,73
and, thus, imposing the curfews violates the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 74 Plaintiffs often base
their challenge of the curfews on the Fourteenth Amendment by
arguing that, because a fundamental right such as the freedom of
movement is involved, the level of scrutiny the court will use to
analyze the law is raised.75 The Fourteenth Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution guarantees that "[n]o state shall... deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."76
This has been interpreted to mean that a state must treat
similarly situated individuals the same. 77 Plaintiffs challenging
70 See id. at 495-96.
71 See id. at 494 (concluding that curfews that are narrowly drawn to accomplish
proper social objectives are valid); see also Johnson v. Opelousas, 658 F.2d 1065, 1074 (5th
Cir. 1981) (stating curfews must be narrowly drawn in order to protect societies valid
interests).
72 See Qutb, 11 F.3d at 494 (focusing on curfews' breadth and exceptions as applied to
juveniles themselves, rather than parental rights); see also Chen, supra note 26, at 158
(discussing how some courts have noted that parents' liberty claims may have some merit,
but have chosen not to address the issue as they often first find that curfew ordinances
violate minors' rights).
73 See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983) (recognizing constitutional right
to freedom of movement); see also Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 126 (1958) (stating how
freedom of movement is "deeply engrained in our history").
74 See U.S. CONST. amend. XlV, § 1 (declaring "[n]o state shall ... deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws"); see also Privor, supra note 41, at
443 (arguing curfews interfere with minors' right of intrastate travel).
75 The idea of imposing a greater level of scrutiny when fundamental rights are
involved came from the famous footnote four in United States v. Carolene Products, 304
U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). See id. Although Carolene Products involved an economic
regulation, Justice Stone noted that when fundamental rights are at issue, a greater level
of scrutiny should be applied. See id. For further discussion on how minimal scrutiny does
not adequately protect fundamental rights, see Jeffery M. Shaman, Article, Cracks in the
Structure: The Coming Breakdown of the Levels of Scrutiny., 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 161, 162
(1984).
76 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
77 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (proclaiming
"Equal Protection Clause ... is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated
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the curfews argue that there is a fundamental right of travel that
both adults and minors enjoy, 78 and that these curfews interfere
with the minors' right to travel while the adults have no
restriction. 79 In Ramos, the plaintiffs were challenging a curfew
imposed on individuals eighteen years old and younger.80 The
plaintiffs successfully argued that if this curfew were imposed on
adults, the curfew would be subject to strict scrutiny and would
be a violation of the adults' right to intrastate travel.81 The
plaintiffs argued that they were prevented from enjoying the
same protections as adults solely because they were minors.8 2
C. Is a Minor's Right the Same as an Adult's Right?
Assuming that there is a right that is infringed upon as a
result of juvenile curfews, the next issue is whether that liberty
should be as vigorously protected as it is for an adult.8 3 There are
many areas of the law in which a minor's liberty has less
constitutional protection than an adult's.8 4 For example, when it
comes to a child's right to purchase pornographic material,
should be treated alike."); see also Privor, supra note 41, at 440 (summarizing different
standards of review that could be applied to equal protection clause claims).
78 See Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358 (discussing "freedom of movement" as a
constitutional right); see also Kent, 357 U.S. at 126 (recognizing that both travel abroad
and travel within country may be necessary for one's livelihood).
79 See Ramos v. Vernon, 353 F.3d 171, 172 (2d Cir. 2003) (refusing to question
Vernon's inherent ability to have curfew ordinance, reasoning that "[j]uvenile curfews
have existed throughout our Nation's history"); see also Privor, supra note 41, at 443-44
(highlighting that some courts have held freedom of movement is not fundamental as
applied to juveniles).
80 See Ramos, 353 F.3d at 172.
81 See id. at 176.
82 See id.
83 See Amitai Etzioni, Do Children Have the Same First Amendment Rights as
Adults?: On Protecting Children From Speech, 79 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 3, 33 (2004)
(illustrating how public may have compelling interest in shielding its children from
harmful material which is freely accessible to adults); see also Gilbert A. Holmes, The Tie
That Binds: The Constitutional Right of Children to Maintain Relationships with Parent-
Like Individuals, 53 MD. L. REV. 358, 386 (1994) (providing, "[w]hile courts have afforded
children's constitutional rights only limited protection in comparison to adults, they
usually restricted children's rights to preserve the corresponding rights of the adults who
take care of them or to promote the children's best interests").
84 See, e.g., Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984) (stating "[c]hildren... are not
assumed to have the capacity to take care of themselves" and thus, "juvenile's liberty
interest may, in appropriate circumstances, be subordinated to the State's "parens patriae
interest in preserving and promoting the welfare of the child"' (quoting Santosky v.
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982))); see also Ginsberg v. New York 390 U.S. 629, 639
(1968) (discussing legislature's option to create law to support children's well-being).
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children's rights are protected with less vigor than adults'
rights.8 5 In Ginsberg v. New York,86 the Court found that a law
banning the sale to minors of magazines that contained nudity
was valid.87 The Court held that, although adults have an
unfettered right to buy this material, a child's right to purchase
such material can be limited and even banned.8 8 In certain cases,
a child may have the same underlying rights as an adult.8 9
However, those rights may be limited by certain state
requirements. 90 For example, states may not impose abortion
laws that unduly burden a minor's right to get an abortion. 91
They can, however, require parental notification and consent.92
Conversely, there are several areas of the law where minors'
rights and adults' rights coexist. 93 For instance, in W. v.
California,94 Justice Marshall emphasized the Supreme Court's
85 See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 639 (concluding that distributing pornographic material
to children is more harmful than distributing it to adults, and therefore law can be
stricter); see also Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531, 545 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (en
banc) (plurality opinion) (limiting children's rights can be justified by enhancing parental
authority).
86 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
87 See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 639 (explaining that N.Y. Penal Law section 484-h
properly recognized "parental role in assessing sex-related material harmful to minors" in
that it did not bar parents from purchasing sex-related magazines for their children if
they desired to do so).
88 See id.
89 See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 169 (1944) (giving use of highways
as an example of common right shared between children and adults); but see Tinker v.
Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 515 (1969) (Stewart, J., concurring)
(asserting that juvenile's rights are not "co-extensive with those of adults").
90 See, e.g., Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292, 295-96 (1997) (holding that judicial
bypass provision in state statute allowing waiver of parental notice requirement in minor
abortion cases was valid means to protect minor's right to abortion if notification was not
in minor's best interest); Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502, 515
(1990) (declaring that judicial bypass provision in parental notification statute comported
with due process and state could require parental notice be given by physician performing
abortion).
91 See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 647-48 (1979) (plurality opinion) (holding that
state statute requiring pregnant minor to obtain consent of parents or judicial approval
following notification to parents unconstitutionally burdened minor's right to an
abortion); see also Lambert, 520 U.S. at 295-96 (listing four Bellotti criteria to use when
analyzing constitutionality of minor abortion laws).
92 See Lambert, 520 U.S. at 295-96 (noting that parental notification requirement can
be constitutional in limited circumstances); see also Akron Center for Reproductive Health,
497 U.S. at 511 (explaining that intrusiveness of parental consent statute requires state
to provide some sort of bypass procedure).
93 See W. v. California, 449 U.S. 1043, 1047 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating
that "minor's right with respect to many [Fourteenth Amendment] claims is virtually
coextensive with an adult's"); see also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967) (emphasizing that
"neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone.").
94 449 U.S. 1043 (1980).
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traditional sensitivity to a minor's claim that a state had
deprived her of her liberty.95 Further, in Tinker v. Des Moines
School District,96 the Court protected a minor's right to freedom
of speech just as it would an adult's.97 The Court held that minor
students have a right to wear black armbands in protest of the
Vietnam War because students are persons under the
Constitution and their fundamental rights must be protected. 98
Courts are split, however, on whether a minor's right to
intrastate travel should be treated the same way as an adult's
right to intrastate travel. 99 On the one hand, the court in
Hutchins found that a juvenile curfew did not interfere with the
intrastate travel of a minor.100 The court reasoned that, although
minors are generally protected by the same constitutional
guarantees as adults,101 the degree to which those rights are
protected is lower for minors.102 However, the court in Ramos
found that minors do have the same right to intrastate travel as
adults.103 The court reasoned that the intermediate level of
scrutiny was sufficient to protect the constitutional right to
intrastate travel.10 4
95 See W., 449 U.S. at 1047 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (offering "our cases have
exhibited particular sensitivity to minors' claims to constitutional protection against
deprivations of liberty by the State").
96 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
97 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 505 (holding that "wearing of an armband for the purpose
of expressing certain views is the type of symbolic act that is within the Free Speech
Clause of the First Amendment").
98 See id. at 511 (stating "[i]n the absence of a specific showing of constitutionally
valid reasons to regulate their speech, students are entitled to freedom of expression of
their views").
99 Compare Hutchins v. Columbia, 188 F.3d 531, 534 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (en banc)
(plurality opinion) (holding that juvenile curfew implicated neither parents' nor minors'
fundamental rights), with Ramos v. Town of Vernon, 353 F.3d 171, 182 (2d Cir. 2003)
(holding that juvenile curfew ordinance interfered with juveniles' fundamental right to
move about freely).
100 See Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 538.
101 See id. at 541.
102 See id.
103 See Ramos, 353 F.3d at 172.
104 See id. at 181. Even though the court in Ramos found that minors have the same
rights as adults, the court employed an intermediate level of scrutiny. See id. The Ramos
court cites Supreme Court language that states because a child is mentally and physically




D. What Level of Scrutiny is Involved?
There are several levels of scrutiny that a court can apply
when analyzing a constitutional challenge.105 The level of
scrutiny applied is important because it determines who has the
burden of proof and by what standard it must be proven.106 The
lowest level of scrutiny and hardest for a plaintiff to overcome is
rational basis.107 Rational basis requires that a law be rationally
related to a legitimate government interest.108 The burden to
prove that such law is not rationally related to a legitimate
government interest is on the person challenging the law. 109 The
court accords great deference to the state when using the rational
basis level of scrutiny, and nearly any law will survive unless the
plaintiff can prove the law is irrational.110
The next level of scrutiny is an intermediate standard.1l1 This
intermediate level is mainly used when dealing with quasi-
105 See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (summarizing different levels of
scrutiny to be applied by reviewing court to determine whether state legislation violates
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause); see also Ramos, 353 F.3d at 174-75
(reviewing different levels of scrutiny when "legislative enactment has been challenged on
equal protection grounds").
106 See Ramos, 353 F.3d at 175. If rational basis is applied, the challenger must bring
forth evidence that the law is irrational. See id. If a higher level of scrutiny is applied, the
government must then defend the law. See id. However, see Frederick Schauer, Judicial
Opinion Writing: Opinions as Rules, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1455, 1458 n.20 (1995), for an
interesting critique of the levels of scrutiny. The author suggests that the level of scrutiny
is of little importance because it is "but a variant on a burden of proof," and the court
merely hides behind this "sufficiently malleable verbal formulae" to get to its desired
outcome. See id.
107 See Clark, 486 U.S. at 461 (noting that rational basis scrutiny is lowest level); see
also Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 331-32 (1981) (stating that, in rational basis review,
there is "presumption of rationality that can only be overcome by a clear showing of
arbitrariness and irrationality" by plaintiff).
108 See Clark, 486 U.S. at 461 (proclaiming, "[a]t a minimum, a statutory
classification must be rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose"); see also
Ramos, 353 F.3d at 175 (declaring "[rnational basis review.., requires that the law be
rationally related to a legitimate government interest").
109 See Hodel, 452 U.S. at 331-32 (discussing plaintiffs burden under rational basis
review); see also Ramos, 353 F.3d at 175 (stating law will survive rational basis review
unless plaintiff proves it irrational).
110 See Hodel, 452 U.S. at 332 (requiring plaintiff to make "clear showing of
arbitrariness and irrationality"); see also Ramos, 353 F.3d at 175 (emphasizing plaintiffs
burden to prove law is "wholly irrational").
111 See Clark, 486 U.S. at 461 (explaining, "[t]o withstand intermediate scrutiny, a
statutory classification must be substantially related to an important governmental
objective"); see also Ramos, 353 F.3d at 175 (noting that intermediate scrutiny lies
between extremes of rational basis review and strict scrutiny).
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suspect classes,112 such as gender, and dealing with important
rights that, though important, are not considered fundamental
rights.113 Gender has traditionally been categorized as a quasi-
suspect class because of the stereotypes associated with males
and females.114 Under this intermediate level of scrutiny, the
government must show that the challenged legislation is
substantially related to an important governmental interest.115
The final and most stringent level of review is strict
scrutiny.116  Strict scrutiny applies when the legislature
discriminates against a suspect class1 7 or when it burdens an
individual trying to exercise a fundamental right,"i8 such as
freedom of speech. 119 For a law to be upheld under strict
112 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (holding gender is quasi-suspect); see
also Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 98-99 (1982) (determining illegitimate children to
be quasi-suspect class); Ramos, 353 F.3d at 175 (discussing how intermediate scrutiny is
typically used to review laws that employ quasi-suspect classifications).
113 See Ramos, 353 F.3d at 175 (highlighting application of intermediate scrutiny to
laws affecting important rights); see also United States v. Coleman, 166 F.3d 428, 431 (2d
Cir. 1999) (stating that intermediate scrutiny may be applied to review a law that affects
"important, though not constitutional, right").
114 See Craig, 429 U.S. at 192-93 (discussing reasons for reviewing gender
classifications under intermediate scrutiny); see also Ramos, 353 F.3d at 175
(acknowledging gender as quasi-suspect class).
115 See Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980) (applying
intermediate scrutiny to gender discrimination case and thus stating "gender-based
discriminations must serve important governmental objectives and that the
discriminatory means employed must be substantially related to the achievement of those
objectives"); see also Ramos, 353 F. 3d at 175 (noting intermediate scrutiny requires
government to show that "challenged legislative enactment is substantially related to an
important governmental interest").
116 See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (listing strict scrutiny as "most
exacting scrutiny"); see also Ramos, 353 F.3d at 175 (describing when heightened level of
review, that is, strict scrutiny should be employed).
117 See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 357 (1978) (commenting that
strict scrutiny applies to legislation that refers to suspect classes); see also Ramos, 353
F.3d at 175 (stating "strict scrutiny.., applies when legislation discriminates on the
basis of a person's membership in a suspect class").
118 See Clark, 486 U.S. at 461 (noting that classifications that affect fundamental
rights are subject to strict scrutiny); see also Bakke, 438 U.S. at 357 (commenting that
strict scrutiny applies to legislation limiting fundamental rights); Ramos, 353 F.3d at 175
(stating "strict scrutiny ... applies when legislation ... burdens a group's exercise of a
fundamental right").
119 See Lac Vieux Desert Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Mich. Gaming
Control Bd., 172 F.3d 397, 410 (6th Cir. 1999) (explaining ordinance in question affects
fundamental right of freedom of speech and therefore is subject to strict scrutiny); see also
Dunagin v. City of Oxford, 718 F.2d 738, 752 (5th Cir. 1983) (proclaiming "[f]reedom of
speech is of course a fundamental right that would ordinarily trigger strict scrutiny").
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scrutiny, the government must show that the law is narrowly
tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest.120
Courts have been divided on what level of scrutiny to apply to
juvenile curfews.121 On the one hand, the court in Hutchins
applied the lowest level of scrutiny,122 thereby placing the burden
on the plaintiffs to prove the curfew was irrational.123 On the
other side, the court in W. v. State,124 applying strict scrutiny,
held that a juvenile curfew was unconstitutional because the
curfew had no relationship to the government's purpose of
controlling minors' activities past a certain time. 125 Determining
which level of scrutiny to apply is the most important aspect of a
court's analysis; in many respects, it will determine the outcome
of the case. 126 For example, if rational basis is applied, the state
is almost certain to have a valid statute as long as there is a
legitimate state interest.127 However, when dealing with an
intermediate level of scrutiny just having a valid state interest is
120 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (asserting that
racial classifications will only be constitutional after they are analyzed under strict
scrutiny and found to be narrowly tailored to further compelling governmental interests);
see also Ramos, 353 F.3d at 175 (reviewing strict scrutiny burden on government).
121 See Chen, supra note 26, at 151-52 (discussing how some courts have applied
rational basis standard while other courts apply strict scrutiny, believing that youth
curfews should be given same constitutional tests that are accorded to adults); compare
Ramos, 353 F.3d at 180 (applying intermediate level of scrutiny to curfew legislation),
with Hutchins v. Columbia, 188 F.3d 531, 539 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (en banc) (plurality
opinion) (analyzing juvenile's right of movement under rational basis review), and Waters
v. Barry, 711 F. Supp 1125, 1139 (D.D.C. 1989) (using strict scrutiny to review District's
curfew legislation).
122 Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 539.
123 See id.
124 356 So. 2d 48 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
125 See id. at 50 (holding statute unconstitutional "since it cannot be said that
prohibition against the mere presence of a child ... on a street or park ... between 11:00
P.M. and 5:00 A.M .... has any real relationship to the primary purpose of the statute");
see also Veilleux, supra note 52, at *3b (explaining court's rationale in W. v. State for
finding law unconstitutional).
126 See generally Hodgkins v. Peterson, 355 F.3d 1048, 1059-64 (7th Cir. 2004)
(applying strict scrutiny standard to curfew law and finding it unconstitutional because it
is not narrowly tailored even though it serves significant governmental interest); see also
Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 946-49 (9th Cir. 1997) (declaring curfew law
unconstitutional under strict scrutiny because although City has compelling government
interest, which would be enough under rational basis review, law is not narrowly
tailored).
127 See Juvenile Curfews and the Major Confusion, supra note 1, at 2412 (commenting
that to satisfy rational basis review, only mere rational basis is required); see also
Douglas G. Smith, A Return to First Principles? Saenz v. Roe and the Privledges or
Immunities Clause, 2000 UTAH L. REV. 305, 353 (2001) (explaining that courts applying
rational basis review generally uphold curfew statutes).
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not enough.128 The statute must actually have a legitimate goal
and must be substantially related to that goal.129
E. The Government's Interest Versus the Minor's Interest
Once a court decides what level of scrutiny to apply, the final
step is to apply that level of scrutiny.130 The court must identify
what interest(s) the government may have in imposing curfews
and whether such interests are accomplished and related to the
curfews. 131 During the final analysis, courts may also address
whether such governmental interests outweigh the rights of the
minor. 132
Governments argue that they have an interest in protecting
their citizens from becoming victims, 133 preventing crime,134 and
promoting responsible parental decision-making.1 35 The main
128 See Ramos, 353 F.3d at 185 (noting when reviewing statute under intermediate
scrutiny "Equal Protection Clause requires more than the mere incantation of a proper
state purpose." (quoting Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 769 (1977))); see also Schleifer
v. City of Charlottesville, 159 F.3d 843, 847 (4th Cir. 1998) (stating under appropriate
intermediate scrutiny review, court must determine whether ordinance is substantially
related to important governmental interest).
129 This standard is the one articulated in Ramos. See 353 F.3d at 175. The court in
Ramos analyzed curfew statute under intermediate scrutiny and found it was
unconstitutional since the town could not show children were primary beneficiaries of the
legislation while the Hutchins court analyzed the curfew statute under rational basis
scrutiny and found it was constitutional since there was important government interest.
See Juvenile Curfews and the Major Confusion, supra note 1, at 2414-15.
130 See LaCava, supra note 3, at 1234 (explicating "final step in evaluating curfew
cases is applying the appropriate standard of review"); see generally Privor, supra note 41,
at 445 (providing "once the court identifies a fundamental right, it should proceed with
strict scrutiny review").
131 See LaCava, supra note 3, at 1234 (arguing intermediate scrutiny, which requires
regulations to be substantially related to important government interests, is proper
standard for juvenile curfew cases); see also Privor, supra note 41, at 445-46 (discussing
mechanics of juvenile curfew challenge under strict scrutiny).
132 See Ramos, 353 F.3d at 181 (giving extra deference to Vernon's interest "in light of
attributes particular to children"); see also Veilleux, supra note 52, at *3b (discussing
variety of balancing approaches used by courts).
133 See Ramos, 353 F. 3d at 193 (Winter, J., dissenting) (listing prevention of harm as
a purpose of curfew ordinance advanced by Town of Vernon); see also Hutchins v. District
of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531, 541-42 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (en banc) (plurality opinion)
(considering government's interest in protecting juveniles).
134 See Ramos, 353 F. 3d at 193 (Winter, J., dissenting) (raising ordinance goal of
protecting community from juvenile crime); see also Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 541-42 (noting
government's interest in preventing juveniles from perpetrating crimes).
135 See Hutchins, 118 F.3d at 541-42 (highlighting government's interest in
promoting responsible parenting); see also LaCava, supra note 3, at 1208 (discussing how
courts have considered if promoting parental responsibility is an important governmental
interest).
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reason governments impose curfews is to protect children from
crime and to reduce crime committed by minors. 136 The rationale
behind the juvenile curfew's effectiveness is that juveniles are
less likely to commit crimes and be victimized if they are not on
the streets at night.137 The issue is whether this rationale is
correct and meets whichever level of scrutiny is applied.138
Courts are split on whether such interests meet the level of
scrutiny applied and whether such interests are served by the
curfew.139 In Ramos, the court held that the government failed to
show how imposing a curfew reduced gang violence and protected
minors.140 The court reasoned that the intermediate level of
scrutiny required more than the mere incantation of a proper
state purpose and also that most criminal activity happened at a
time the curfew was not in effect.141 Conversely, in Hutchins, the
court held that the government had a proper state purpose in
preventing crime and that, although the challengers argued that
most crime did not happen during curfew hours, the court found
that there was a "fit" between the curfew and the stated purpose
of crime reduction.142
136 See Adams, supra note 6, at 139 (listing the various benevolent effects of curfews);
see also Privor, supra note 41, at 423-24 (stating both government officials and members
of public are in favor of the crime reducing effects of curfews).
137 See Adams, supra note 6, at 138 (emphasizing that children who are outside late
at night or during early morning hours are being inappropriately supervised); see also
World News Tonight with Peter Jennings (ABC television broadcast March 12, 1991)
(transcript available on Lexis) (quoting Davetta Johnson as stating, "If a child is out late
at night, then a child has failed to be supervised"); but see Privor, supra note 41, at 448
(suggesting "In some cases, a law forcing children to stay at home may actually increase
the likelihood that they will become victims of violent crime").
138 There is great debate over whether such goals are met by juvenile curfews. One
scholar argues that such curfews are ineffective because of the incorrect assumptions that
crime happens during curfew hours and that delinquents will not change their criminal
activity to a different time. See Adams, supra note 6, at 140. The scholar further argues
that less crime happens during curfew hours then during afternoon hours. See id. at 151.
Another scholar reinforces these contentions by pointing out that "a minor's decision to
leave the house is plainly distinct from the decision to engage in criminal activity." Privor,
supra note 41, at 447-48.
139 See, e.g., Ramos, 353 F.3d at 185-86 (concluding that curfew does not withstand
review due to loose fit between curfew legislation and crime prevention); Hutchins, 188
F.3d at 543-44 (finding close statistical relationship between juvenile crime and curfew
hours).
140 See Ramos, 353 F.3d at 186.
141 See id. at 185.
142 See Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 543-44.
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F. Split in Courts
The Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in juvenile curfew
cases has left a circuit split on many of the important legal issues
discussed above.143 In Hutchins, the District of Columbia Circuit
read the minors' right involved as being very narrow, mainly
being on the street at night,144 and held that the imposition of a
curfew did not violate that right because the government had a
valid interest that was served by the curfew.145 Conversely, in
Ramos, the Second Circuit interpreted a broad right, the right of
intrastate travel,146 and held that, although the government had
a valid interest in protecting its citizens from crime, the juvenile
curfew did not further such goal. 147
III. EVOLUTION OF JUVENILE CURFEW CASE LAW
A. Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown (1975)
Byko[sky v. Borough of Middletown 48 was the federal courts'
first case involving juvenile curfews.149 The court in Bykofsky
was dealing with vagueness and First and Fourteenth
Amendment challenges to a Pennsylvania curfew.15o The curfew
prohibited minors under the age of eighteen to be on the streets
past 10 p.m. 151 The court first dealt with the vagueness challenge
143 The Third Circuit case, Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242 (D.
Pa. 1975), aff'd, 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir. 1976), presented an opportunity for the Supreme
Court to address the legal issues presented by juvenile curfews; yet, the Court denied
certiorari. See 429 U.S. 964 (1976). Certiorari was also denied, without any reasons given,
in two subsequent cases: Qutb v. Strauss, 511 U.S. 1127 (1994), and Schleifer v. City of
Charlottesville, 526 U.S. 1018 (1999). As one scholar has noted, "the issue of how to
analyze the constitutionality of juvenile curfew ordinances will be resolved only when the
Supreme Court finally grants certiorari for a juvenile curfew case." See LaCava, supra
note 3, at 1237.
144 Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 545.
145 Id. at 545.
146 See Ramos, 353 F.3d at 176.
147 See id. at 177.
148 401 F. Supp. 1242 (D. Pa. 1975), affld, 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir. 1976).
149 See Bykofsky, 401 F. Supp. at 1245 (noting complete lack of federal legal authority
and paucity of state legal authority dealing with juvenile curfew ordinances); see also
LaCava, supra note 3, at 1213 n.133 (recognizing Bykofsky as the first circuit court case to
adjudicate the constitutionality of a juvenile curfew ordinance).
150 See Bykofsky, 401 F. Supp. at 1248.
151 See id. at 1246-47.
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and held that, with the deletion of phrases such as "normal ...
nighttime activities," the statute was not unconstitutionally
vague.152 Next, the court went though several circumstances in
which minors' rights were not analogous to that of an adult,153
and held that the conduct of minors could be constitutionally
regulated to a greater extent than the conduct of adults. 154 The
court finally held that there was a rational relationship between
the government's goals of protecting children, enforcing parental
responsibility, and protecting the public from the nocturnal
mischief of minors and imposing the curfew.155
The Bykofsky case was a loss for juveniles for two reasons.
First, the court used the lowest level scrutiny, the rational basis
test, 156 and second, the court specifically noted that minors do
not enjoy the same constitutional protection as adults.157
Although Bykofsky set certain standards of review for juvenile
curfew cases and was, overall, a loss for juveniles, cases that
followed almost always took novel and different approaches to
many of the legal issues caused by juvenile curfews.158
B Johnson v. Opelousas (1981)
The next major case was decided six years later and took a
different approach than Bykofsky. The Fifth Circuit, in Johnson
v. Opelousas,159 was dealing with a nearly identical curfew as the
152 See id. at 1252.
153 See id. at 1256 (listing rights to vote, enlist in military, contract, operate motor
vehicles, and to purchase and consume alcoholic beverages as examples).
154 See id. at 1254.
155 See id. at 1255-56.
156 See id. at 1265 (explaining "since the curfew ordinance does not infringe upon a
fundamental right and does not create a suspect classification, the traditional rational
basis test is the proper yardstick to utilize in determining the constitutionality of the
ordinance").
157 See id. at 1254 (commenting how "it is apparent that the constitutional rights of
adults and juveniles are not co-extensive").
158 Compare Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville, 159 F.3d 843, 847 (4th Cir. 1998)
(applying an intermediate level of scrutiny), and Hodgkins v. Peterson, 355 F.3d 1048,
1058 (7th Cir. 2004) (using an intermediate level of scrutiny, but stating that the
application of either strict or intermediate scrutiny would make no difference on the
outcome of the case), with Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 946 (9th Cir. 1997)
(applying a strict scrutiny standard but noting that strict scrutiny in the context of
minors "may allow greater burdens on minors than would be permissible on adults as a
result of the unique interests implicated in regulating minors").
159 658 F.2d 1065 (5th Cir. 1981).
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one in Bykofsky.160 It required juveniles seventeen or younger to
be off the street by 11 p.m. 161 The appellants argued that the
curfew law was overbroad and violated the minors' First
Amendment rights.162 Unlike the Byko/sky court, the Johnson
court noted that minors, though not the same as adults, do enjoy
the First Amendment's guarantee to freedom of speech.163 The
court further held that minors, certainly like any other United
States citizen, enjoy the right to intrastate travel.164 In
conclusion, the court found the curfew constitutionally invalid
because it was overbroad.165
The Johnson case took an extremely different approach than
the Bykofsky case. First, it found that minors do have a strong
First Amendment right that needs to be protected.166
Additionally, it found that minors do have an unfettered right to
intrastate travel. 167 Finally, instead of giving deference to the
government's interest, the court found the minors' rights to be
more important and invalidated the statute on broadness
principals.168 Although this was a win for juveniles, the battle
was far from over and the case law on juvenile curfews has
continued to grow and differ. 169
C. Qutb v. Straus (1993)
Qutb v. Strauss,170 the final case in the trilogy of early juvenile
curfew cases, was decided twelve years after Johnson and took a
160 Compare id. at 1067 n.1 (reproducing Opelousas' nocturnal juvenile curfew
ordinance), with Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242, 1246 (D. Pa.
1975) (presenting Middletown's juvenile curfew ordinance).
161 See Johnson, 658 F. 2d at 1067 n.1.
162 See id. at 1067-68.
163 See id. at 1072.
164 See id. at 1072 (5th Cir. 1981).
165 See id. at 1074.
166 See id. at 1072.
167 See id.
168 See id.
169 See generally Juvenile Curfews and the Major Confusion, supra note 1, at 2400
(emphasizing that there have been three decades of fragmented lawmaking at circuit
court level since Supreme Court denied certiorari in Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown,
429 U.S. 964 (1976)); see also Cheri L. Lichtensteiger Baden, Note, When the Open Road is
Closed to Juveniles: The Constitutionality of Juvenile Curfew Laws and the Inconsistencies
Among the Courts, 37 VAL. U. L. REV. 831, 847-53 (2003) (discussing varying case law
throughout circuit courts regarding juvenile curfews).
170 11 F.3d 488 (5th Cir. 1993).
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completely different direction than the Johnson case. The curfew
law at issue in Qutb was distinct from those in prior cases. 171 The
Dallas ordinance prohibited persons under the age of seventeen
from remaining in a public place or establishment from 11 p.m.
until 6 a.m. and from 12 midnight to 6 a.m. on the weekends.172
The difference with this curfew was that there were several
exceptions.173 The exceptions included being accompanied by a
parent or guardian, going on an errand, and attending school,
religious, or First Amendment related activity.174 The above
curfew law became the model law enacted by many jurisdictions
across the country.175
The plaintiffs argued that the ordinance violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.176 The court
first dealt with the issue of whether there was an equal
protection claim.177 The court reasoned that, because the statute
distinguished between those who were seventeen or younger and
those who were older, the court had to analyze the curfew
ordinance under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.178 Once the court found that there was a possible
claim of unequal protection,179 the court next had to decide what
171 Compare Qutb, 11 F.3d at 490 (recognizing that the juvenile curfew ordinance
under review contained a multitude of exceptions and defenses), with Johnson, 658 F.2d
at 1074 (involving a curfew of broad general applicability).
172 See Qutb, 11 F.3d at 490.
173 See id. at 490.
174 See id. If a minor was suspected of being in violation of the ordinance, the
ordinance also required the police to ask the age of the apparent offender and to ask why
he or she was out past curfew. See id. An officer had discretion to either fine or arrest the
offender so long as the officer reasonably believed that the person had violated the
ordinance and that no exceptions applied. See id. at 490-91. The fine for a single violation
of the ordinance could not exceed 500 dollars. See id. at 491. The ordinance did not apply
to persons under the age of seventeen that were married or who had the disability of
minority removed in accordance with the Texas Family Code. See id. at 490.
175 See Juvenile Curfews and the Major Confusion, supra note 1, at 2403, 2413
(recognizing that many municipalities modeled their juvenile curfew ordinances after
Dallas' ordinance once it had withstood strict scrutiny analysis by the Fifth Circuit); see
also Brian J. Lester, Comment, Is it Too Late for Juvenile Curfews? Qutb Logic and the
Constitution, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 665, 697 (1996) (stating that cities emulated Dallas
curfew ordinance from Qutb following decision in that case).
176 See Qutb, 11 F.3d at 491-92.
177 See id. at 492 (determining whether claim involved governmental action that
distinguished between two or more groups).
178 See id. (stating that "[b]ecause the curfew ordinance distinguishes between two
groups, we must analyze the curfew ordinance under the Equal Protection Clause").
179 See id. The court declared that an equal protection inquiry was required when a
"challenged governmental action classifies or distinguishes between two or more relevant
ST JOIN S JOURNVAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY
standard of review was proper.i8 0 The court chose the strict
scrutiny standard of review,iS1 assuming a fundamental right
was abridged.i8 2 The court then held that the government had a
strong and compelling interest in protecting its citizens by
reducing juvenile crime.' 8 3 Subsequently, the court analyzed
whether the ordinance was narrowly tailored to accomplish such
a purpose.184 The court failed to address the issue of whether
juveniles, like adults, have a right to intrastate travel, but
assumed the ordinance impinged on a fundamental right in order
to apply the strict scrutiny standard of review. 185
At the end of its analysis, the court held that the statute was
valid.' 8 6 The court's rationale for its decision was: (1) that
although there was no data or evidence presented by the
government that juvenile crimes happened during the curfew
hours, the statute "fit" the government's compelling interest in
protecting its citizens; and (2) that although a court should
analyze the statute by what it prohibits and not what it exempts,
the exemptions can not be viewed in isolation, but as part of the
whole curfew ordinance, thus making it narrowly tailored. 8 7
groups .... See id. The court found that there was an issue of unequal protection
because the curfew ordinance at issue distinguished persons under the age of seventeen
by treating them differently from persons over the age of seventeen. See id.
180 See id. (noting that Equal Protection analysis required the court to determine the
proper standard of review based on the right or classification at issue).
181 See id. (applying the strict scrutiny analysis by assuming that the right to move
freely was a fundamental right); see also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-17 (1982)
(describing strict scrutiny review under Equal Protection Clause as being applied to
classifications that disadvantage suspect classes).
182 See Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488, 492 (5th Cir. 1993) (declaring "[b]ecause we
assume that the curfew impinges upon a fundamental right, we will now subject the
ordinance to strict scrutiny review").
183 See Qutb, 11 F.3d at 492; see also Hodgkins v. Peterson, 355 F.3d 1048, 1059-60
(7th Cir. 2004) (stating that a governmental interest in protecting the public from juvenile
crime and reducing juvenile crime was compelling); Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville,
159 F.3d 843, 847-49 (4th Cir. 1998) (finding that reducing juvenile crime was a
compelling interest because it was necessary to reduce overall crime).
184 See Qutb, 11 F.3d at 492-93.
185 See id. at 492. The court did not decide whether juveniles have the right to move
freely in public; it only assumed that juveniles had the right to move freely in public, thus
enabling it to apply the strict scrutiny standard of review. See id.
186 See id. at 494. "With the ordinance before us today, the city of Dallas has created
a nocturnal juvenile curfew that satisfies strict scrutiny. By including the defenses to a
violation of the ordinance, the city has enacted a narrowly drawn ordinance that allows
the city to meet its stated goals while respecting the rights of the affected minors." Id.
187 See id. at 493-94. The court found that the data the city provided was sufficient to
show a fit between the compelling interest and the curfew ordinance. See id. at 493.
Moreover, the exceptions and defenses of the ordinance allowed juveniles to remain in
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After states started to model their statutes after the Dallas
curfew,188 more case law began to develop and more confusion
ensued.189
D. Recent Developments
There are several recent cases that cite to Qutb and earlier
case law that have cast doubt on a clear understanding of the
legality of juvenile curfews. 190 Those cases include Nunez v. San
Diego,191 Ramos v. Town of Vernon,192 Schleifer v. City of
Charlottesville,193 and Hutchins v. District of Columbia.194 In
Nunez, the Ninth Circuit struck down a juvenile curfew law
similar to that of the Dallas law by applying strict scrutiny.195
The court held that the ordinance was invalid because it violated
the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution.196
The court held that, even though the Supreme Court, in Bellotti
v. Baird,197 held that a minor's constitutional rights are not
public during curfew hours under certain conditions. See id. The court reasoned that this
was not overly broad and, taking the ordinance as a whole, it was narrowly tailored. See
id. at 494.
188 See Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 942 F. Supp. 665, 678 (D.D.C. 1996)
(illustrating juvenile curfew ordinance adopted by District of Columbia from "Dallas,
Texas, juvenile ordinance that withstood scrutiny in Qutb"); see also Lester, supra note
175, at 697 (providing that "[a]fter the Qutb decision, cities across the country enacted
curfew ordinances mirroring the Dallas curfew ordinance").
189 See Juvenile Curfews and the Major Confusion, supra note 1, at 2414 (suggesting
"cases since Qutb have plotted an uncertain course"); see also Lester, supra note 175, at
697 (concluding some cities that were "quick to adopt the Dallas ordinance's language
should review the problems with the Qutb court's rationale and tread carefully before
restricting their juveniles").
190 See Juvenile Curfews and the Major Confusion, supra note 1, at 2414 (listing facts
and divergent holdings of major circuit cases following Qutb); see also LaCava, supra note
3, at 1237 (highlighting that "[there is a circuit split regarding almost every aspect of the
constitutional analysis of juvenile curfew cases" meriting Supreme Court review).
191 114 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 1997).
192 353 F.3d 171 (2d Cir. 2003).
193 159 F.3d 843 (4th Cir. 1998).
194 188 F.3d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
195 See Nunez, 114 F.3d at 946.
196 See id. at 951-52.
197 443 U.S. 622 (1979). Although this case is important when analyzing minors'
rights, this case will not be dealt with in this note. The Court in Bellotti set forth a
standard to determine if rights in juvenile right cases are more like rights that are so
important that states cannot interfere, or more like activities over which states have
authority to regulate minors. See LaCava, supra note 3, at 1232. In Bellotti, the court
implemented an analysis with three factors and some circuits have taken this analysis in
juvenile curfew cases as lowering the standard of review, while other courts have taken it
to increase the importance state interest in the analysis. See id. at 1233.
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always the same as those of an adult,198 this should merely
strengthen the state's interest and not decrease the level of
scrutiny.199 In Ramos, the Second Circuit cataloged earlier case
law and decided to try a novel approach by applying an
intermediate level of scrutiny to the challenged curfew law.200 In
the end, the court invalidated the curfew because the city failed
to show how juvenile curfews decreased juvenile crime when
most crime happens during non-curfew hours. 201
In Schleifer, the Fourth Circuit found the minor's rights to be
less fundamental than an adult's and therefore applied the
Ramos intermediate level of scrutiny. 202 However, instead of
invalidating the ordinance, the court held that such curfew,
which was similar to the Dallas curfew, 203 survived such
intermediate level of scrutiny. 204 Finally, and most importantly,
the Hutchins court took a completely different approach by
applying a low level of scrutiny and narrowly construing the
minor's right involved.205 This approach led the District of
Columbia Circuit, sitting en banc, to uphold the juvenile
curfew. 206 Each of the above courts took a different approach, and
validated or invalidated curfew laws for different reasons.
198 See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 634 (recognizing "three reasons justifying the conclusion
that the constitutional rights of children cannot be equated with those of adults").
199 See Nunez, 114 F.3d at 945 (stating "Bellotti framework enables courts to
determine whether the state has a compelling interest justifying greater restrictions on
minors than on adults"); see also Juvenile Curfews and the Major Confusion, supra note 1,
at 2414 (explaining "Bellotti should be used to strengthen the state's interest, not to
decrease the level of scrutiny").
200 See Ramos v. Town of Vernon, 353 F.3d 171, 176-78 (2003).
201 See id. at 185.
202 See Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville, 159 F.3d 843, 856-57 (4th Cir. 1998). The
stated purpose of the ordinance was (1) ... protect the general public through the
reduction of juvenile crime ... ; (2) promote the safety and well-being of persons under
the age of seventeen ... ; and (3) foster and strengthen parental responsibility. Id.
203 See id. at 852 (noting Charlottesville curfew, which applies only to those under
seventeen-years-old, begins at midnight during the week and 1:00 a.m. on weekdays,
contains eight exceptions, and is even more narrowly tailored than Dallas curfew to
achieve state's interest).
204 See id. (commenting that Charlottesville curfew "represents the least restrictive
means" to advance state's compelling interest).
205 See Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531, 536-42 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (en
banc) (plurality opinion) (concluding that intermediate scrutiny should be standard of
review in examining scope of curfews and that children's constitutional rights need to be
balanced against their immaturity and their need for state supervision); see also Ramos v.
Town of Vernon, 353 F.3d 171, 177 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting Hutchins approach is
problematic).
206 See Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 548.
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Although the circuits disagree on whether such laws are invalid,
the Hutchins court went in a completely different direction than
prior case law and it is suggested that both the courts' rationale
and holding are flawed.
IV. A CLOSER LOOK AT HUTCHINS
In Hutchins, the District of Columbia Circuit, sitting en banc,
was faced with a challenge to a juvenile ordinance similar to the
model ordinance upheld in Qutb.207 The Curfew Act of 1995
barred juveniles seventeen and under from being in a public
place unaccompanied by a parent from 11p.m. to 6 a.m. Sunday
through Thursday, and from 12 midnight to 6 a.m. Saturday and
Sunday. 20 8 Under this law, a parent or guardian commits an
offense by knowingly permitting, or through insufficient control
allowing, the minor to violate the curfew. 209 The curfew has eight
defenses. 210 There is no violation of the statute if the minor is (1)
accompanied by a parent, guardian, or caretaker;211 (2) on an
errand at the direction of the minor's parent, guardian, or
caretaker, without any detour or stop; (3) in a vehicle involved in
interstate travel; (4) engaged in certain employment activity,
including going to or from employment, without any detour or
stop; (5) involved in an emergency; (6) on the sidewalk that abuts
the minor's or the next-door neighbor's residence, if the neighbor
had not complained to the police; (7) in attendance at an official
school, religious, or other recreational activity sponsored by the
District of Columbia, a civic organization, or another similar
entity that takes responsibility for the minor; and (8) exercising
First Amendment rights including free exercise of religion,
freedom of speech, and the right of assembly.212 Any violation of
the curfew law by a minor could result in an order against the
minor to perform up to twenty-five hours of community service,
207 Compare id. at 534 (describing District curfew ordinance), with Qutb v. Strauss,
11 F.3d 488, 490 (5th Cir. 1993) (explaining the Dallas curfew ordinance).
208 See Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 534.
209 See id.
210 See id. at 536-42.
211 See id. at 535. For the purpose of the statute, a caretaker is anyone over the age of
twenty-one, who is authorized by a parent to take care of the minor. See id.
212 See id.
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and any violation of the curfew law by the parent could result in
either community service or a fine of up to $500.00.213
A group of minors, parents and private businesses
("Appellees") sued the District to enjoin the enforcement of the
curfew law.214 The Appellees argued that the curfew law violated
the minors' Fifth Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection
rights to freedom of movement, 215  the minors' Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures, the minors' First Amendment rights to freedom of
expression and assembly, the parents' Fifth Amendment Due
Process rights to raise their children, and the allegation it is
unconstitutionally vague. 216 The district court granted summary
judgment for the Appellees and held that minors have a
fundamental right to free movement. 217 The court reasoned that,
because the curfew infringed on the minors' rights to free
movement and the parents' rights to raise their children, the law
was subject to strict scrutiny, 218 and the government failed to
meet such high level of scrutiny.219
Here, a plurality of the appellate court reversed and remanded
the case back to the district court to enter summary judgment for
the District of Columbia (Appellants).220 The plurality held that
no fundamental rights of the minors or parents were involved.221
The court noted that even if fundamental rights were implicated,
213 See id.
214 See id. at 534.
215 See id. at 535.
216 See id. The Appellees' First and Fourth Amendment claims were not reached and
will not be discussed in this section of the note. For an earlier discussion involving
challenges to these rights see Section III.
217 See Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 942 F. Supp 665, 680 (D.D.C. 1996) (noting
importance of "cherished freedom of movement"), reu'd en banc, 188 F.3d 531 (D.C. Cir.
1999) (plurality opinion).
218 See Hutchins, 942 F. Supp. at 673-74.
219 See id. at 679. As the District of Columbia had access to information concerning
what time of day juvenile crime was committed and did not try to access it, there was not
a substantially direct connection between the curfew law and the raw juvenile crime rates
the state was trying to lower. See id. Also, the district court found that four of the eight
defenses, the first defense, the emergency defense, the responsible entity defense, and the
sidewalk defense, were unconstitutionally vague and did not withstand constitutional
scrutiny. See id.
220 See Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531, 548 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (en banc)
(plurality opinion).
221 See id. at 534 (commenting "plurality believes that the curfew implicates no
fundamental rights of minors or their parents").
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the curfew law could withstand strict scrutiny.222 The court first
dealt with the issue of whether any fundamental rights of the
minors were involved. 223 The court reasoned that the right to
intrastate travel is not deeply rootd in history and that in fact
the early cases, like Shapiro v. Thompson,224 which held that a
state cannot interfere with the right of interstate travel,225 were
more concerned with a state discriminating against outsiders
rather than the right to move about. 226 The court then went on to
reason that the right to interstate travel is not the same as
intrastate travel.227 The court distinguished the vagrancy cases
that the Appellees used to support the claim that intrastate
travel was a fundamental right.228 The court held that laws
against vagrancy did not violate any fundamental right, but were
still invalid because the statutes gave no notice to perspective
violators.229 The court concluded in its reasoning that no
fundamental right of the minors was involved - perceiving the
rights of minors to be narrower than the rights of adults.230 The
right involved, the court stated, was the right to be on the streets
at night without adult supervision, and that right was not
fundamental. 231 The reason the court used to support their
narrow interpretation of any right was that the Supreme Court
warned the judiciary that the broader the right, the more the
222 See id. at 541.
223 See id. at 536 (beginning discussion on whether due process right exists).
224 394 U.S. 618 (1969). In Shapiro, there was a Connecticut law that made all
persons who did not live in the state for over a year ineligible for welfare assistance. See
id. 622-23. A woman was denied welfare assistance because she had not lived in
Connecticut for a year. See id.
225 See id. at 641 (holding state statute, which required one year residency for welfare
benefits, was invalid).




229 See id. 'While vagrancy statutes certainly prohibit individuals from moving about,
the constitutional infirmity in these statutes is not that they infringe on a fundamental
right to free movement, but that they fail to give fair notice of conduct that is forbidden
and pose a danger of arbitrary enforcement. In other words, they do not afford procedural
due process." Id.
230 See id. at 539 (concluding that the "state's authority over children's activities is
unquestionably broader than that over like actions of adults").
231 See id. at 539 (providing "neither history nor precedent supports the existence of a
fundamental right for juveniles to be in a public place without supervision during curfew
hours, and we decline to recognize one here").
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court should expand on substantive and equal protection
rights.232
The next issue the court dealt with was whether any
fundamental rights of the parents were involved. 233  The
Appellees argued that the curfew interfered with the parents'
fundamental right to raise their children.234 The court held that,
although parents do have such a fundamental right, no such
right was implicated by the curfew. 235 The court reasoned that
early case law held that parents have a fundamental right to
make intimate family decisions, such as their children's
education and upbringing, 236 but do not have a right to
determine when and if their children are allowed on the streets
at night.2 37
In the final part of its opinion, the court held that, even
assuming fundamental rights were involved, the statute would
survive a higher level of scrutiny.238 In Part A, the court
analyzed the minors' rights,239 and in Part B, the court analyzed
the parents' rights.240 Before analyzing either party's rights, the
court first decided that instead of using strict scrutiny, it would
use a lower level of strict scrutiny, even though it was only
232 See Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) (stating that it is
imperative to look to allegations in complaint to determine how petitioner describes
constitutional right which is at stake); see also Hutchins v. D.C., 188 F.3d 531, 538 (D.C.
Cir. 1999) (en banc) (plurality opinion) (declaring that "Supreme Court has warned us
that our analysis must begin with a careful description of the asserted right for the more
general is the right's description, i.e., the free movement of people, the easier is the
extension of substantive due process").
233 See Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 540.
234 See id.
235 See id.
236 In Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923), a statute banning the teaching of
foreign languages was held to be unconstitutional. Id. The Court held that it is the
parents' right to decide what their children learn, and the state cannot interfere with
parents' right to rear their children. See id. at 399-400, 403. In Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925), the Court noted that a child is not the mere creature of the
state; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high
duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations. See id. In that case the
Court was dealing with a law that required minors between the ages of eight and sixteen
to attend public school. See id. at 530. This law was invalidated because it is the parents'
decision where their children attend school. See id. at 534.
237 See Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 540-41 (arguing that parents' fundamental rights do
not extend to determining if and when children can be out on streets).
238 See id. at 541. "Even if the curfew implicated fundamental rights of children or
their parents, it would survive heightened scrutiny." Id.
239 See id. at 541-45.
240 See id. at 545-46.
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assuming that a fundamental right was involved.241 In Part A,
the court began its determination of the minors' rights by
identifying an important state interest involved.242 The interest
cited was the safety of the community from violence. 243 Once an
important interest of the state was identified, the court then
went on to analyze whether such interest was substantially
related to the law enacted. 244 The Appellees argued that the
statute was not substantially related because most violent
activity was occurring during non-curfew hours, and was being
committed by people older then seventeen. 245 The court held that
the state was not required to demonstrate an exact fit between
the interest and the law,2 46 and concluded by reasoning that the
statute is substantially related because statistics show that since
the statute's enactment, there had been a 34% decrease in
nighttime juvenile arrests. 247
In Part B the court analyzed the parents' rights.248 The court
again analyzed these rights using an intermediate level of
scrutiny.249 It began by citing Ginsberg v. New York,250 which
241 See id. at 541. Although the court stated it would survive heightened scrutiny, the
court did not analyze the statute under the heightened level. See id. Instead it used a
different type of intermediate scrutiny. Id. The level the court used had less protection
then the normal intermediate level. See id. The court said the reason a lesser level of
scrutiny was used was because children were not equal to adults, and that although they
have fundamental rights, children are not as mature and a lesser level of protection is
okay. See id.
242 See id. at 541-42 (concluding that government had interest in protecting minors'
well-being).
243 See id. (noting "asserted government interest here is to protect the welfare of
minors by reducing the likelihood that minors will perpetrate or become victims of crime
and by promoting parental responsibility").
244 See id. at 542 (stating that this test of whether government's interest in protecting
minors is "substantially related" to law enacted calls for higher inquiry standard then
rational basis, but more deferential one than strict scrutiny's narrow tailoring
component).
245 See id.
246 See id. at 543 (explaining that this district does not have to prove precise fit
between problem at issue and its legislative remedy since all that is required is some type
of substantial relationship between two).
247 See id. at 543-44. The Metropolitan Police Department suggested that the curfew
effectively kept juveniles off the streets, as prior to enacting the curfew "more than 50% of
juvenile arrests took place during curfew hours." Id. at 544. Appellees argue that these
statistics are flawed because they fail to recognize the possibility of other contributing
factors to the decrease in arrests. See id.
248 See id. at 545.
249 See id. (concluding intermediate level scrutiny appropriate because curfew serves
to enhance parental authority).
250 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
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held that a law forbidding a minor from buying material with
nudity did not unconstitutionally take away a parent's right to
raise a child because the parent could always buy the magazine
for the child.251 The court reasoned that the case under review
was similar to Ginsberg because a parent had the ability to send
his or her child on an errand.252 The court concluded by stating
that the errand exception together with the rest of the exceptions
essentially gave the parent total control over her child.253
V. HUTCHINS IS FLAWED
The Hutchins case is flawed and wrongly interpreted the
legality of juvenile curfews. There are several problems with the
court's reasoning. The flaws are apparent in its identification of
the parties' rights, the level of scrutiny, and the analysis of the
statute in relation to the state's interests.
A. The Minors'Rights
The Hutchins case wrongly interpreted the minors' right as
"the right to be on the streets at night without adult
supervision."254 This narrow interpretation and the court's
reasoning are incorrect for several reasons. First, contrary to the
court's opinion in Hutchins, which noted that intrastate travel is
not the same or protected like interstate travel,255 the Supreme
Court, in Kolender v. Lawson,256 recognized that there is a right
to freedom of movement which is broader than interstate
travel. 257 Further, Justice Marshall, in Bykofsky v. Borough of
251 See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 639.
252 See Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531, 545 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (en banc)
(plurality opinion) (highlighting that interpretation of Ginsberg statute was comparable to
curfew because both had been read as supporting parental authority).
253 See id. (asserting "curfew's defenses allow the parents almost total discretion over
their children's activities during curfew hours").
254 Id. at 538; compare id. (defining "scope and dimensions" of asserted right
narrowly so as to avoid level of generality against which Supreme Court warns), with
Ramos v. Town of Vernon, 353 F.3d 171, 177 (2d Cir. 2003) (rejecting Hutchins court's
interpretation of juveniles' constitutional interest as too narrow).
255 See Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 536-38 (explaining that while interstate travel is a well-
established right, circuits are split on whether right to intrastate travel is recognized).
256 461 U.S. 352 (1983).
257 See Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358.
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Middletown,258 stated that "the freedom to leave one's house and
move about at will is 'of the very essence of a scheme of ordered
liberty."'259 Second, if Hutchins were correct in interpreting the
right to be analyzed as the right of the minor to be on the street
at night without adult supervision, 260 that would mean, as the
Ramos court stated, that a minor's right to move around would
be stronger during the day and disappear as soon as the curfew
hour hit.261 Defining a right by the time of day does not comport
with this country's founding principles and has no place in
determining whether a fundamental right is involved.262 Finally,
minors are protected by the same constitutional guarantees as
adults. 263 Although the Supreme Court has held that a minor's
rights can be protected less vigorously than an adult's, that does
not mean that those rights do not exist and are not
fundamental. 264 The court should not have narrowly construed
the rights of the minors to being on the street at night, for such
constriction virtually takes away any right of the minors.
Instead, the court should have identified a right of intrastate
258 401 F. Supp. 1242 (M.D. Pa. 1975), affd, 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir. 1976).
259 Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 429 U.S. 964, 964 (1976) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
260 See Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 539 (determining that there was no case law supporting
the legitimacy of a fundamental right for "juveniles to be in a public place without adult
supervision" at night).
261 See Ramos v. Town of Vernon, 353 F.3d 171, 177 (2d Cir. 2003). "If the Hutchins
formulation of the interest were correct, then juveniles' constitutional rights would appear
in the morning and disappear at night." Id.
262 See id. at 176-77 (holding time of day is irrelevant as to question of existence of
constitutional right, but may be relevant to discussion on state's interest in regulating
that right); see generally LaCava, supra note 3, at 1228 (noting that when court defines
right too narrowly there is real danger right becomes mirror image of particular scale-
tipping burden).
263 See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976). "Constitutional
rights do not mature and come into being magically only when one attains the state-
defined age of majority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and
possess constitutional rights." Id. "[Aluthority possessed by the State to prescribe and
enforce standards of conduct in its schools, although concededly very broad, must be
exercised consistently with constitutional safeguards." Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574
(1975). "[Nleither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone."
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967).
264 See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 633 (1979) (noting that although minors are
not beyond the protection of the Constitution, their status as "minors under the law is
unique"); Planned Parenthood, 428 U.S. at 74 (1976) ('The Court... has recognized that
the State has somewhat broader authority to regulate the activities of children than of
adults."); see also Ramos, 353 F.3d at 177 (suggesting unique vulnerabilities and needs of
children allow government greater range in regulating the manner in which children
exercise their constitutional rights).
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travel and reasoned that such right may be protected less than
an adult's right.265
B. The Parent's Right
The Hutchins court spent little time on the important right of
parents. The court's reasoning was flawed in holding that a
parent's right to raise her children was not infringed by the
curfew law, which set the time a child must be at home.266 The
reason that the court's reasoning was flawed was that the United
States has a long history of upholding parents' rights to raise
their children and to make parental decisions. 267 In Prince v.
Massachusetts,268 the Court emphasized that "the custody, care,
and nurture of the child reside first in the parents."269 The
Hutchins court held that, although parents have these rights,
assigning a curfew to their children and deciding what time is a
reasonable time for their children to be home was not within that
right.270 It is the parents' job to set limits for their child.271
265 Compare with Ramos, where the court explained certain inherent limitations of
juveniles which may warrant special constitutional treatment. 353 F.3d at 177-78. As
stated earlier, there are several areas of law where minors' rights are protected less
vigorously than adults', and there are also certain areas where both groups' rights are
coexistent. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 84. The juvenile curfew law resembles
those laws where both parties are protected equally. The right involved in curfew
violations is more like minors' Fourth and First Amendment rights, which are protected
just like adults' rights. Instead of implying that the rights are the same, which is very
controversial, the position of this paper is that minors' rights can be treated differently.
266 Cf. Ramos, 353 F.3d at 182 (explaining that parents have right to determine when
and where a child is to be permitted outside the home, as parents are primarily
responsible for instilling children with their morals and values).
267 See Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (finding government
may not unreasonably interfere "with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the
upbringing and education of children"); see also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401
(1923) (holding that parents have the fundamental right to decide how their children
ought to be educated); Privor, supra note 41, at 449 (positing "role of the family unit in
child rearing is well-defined in American jurisprudence").
268 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
269 Id. at 166.
270 See Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531, 540 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (en banc)
(plurality opinion) (holding that although a parent possesses a fundamental right to
control the upbringing of his child, it is not infringed by the application of the curfew).
271 See Prince, 321 U.S. at 166 (commenting parent's right to control his child is
protected, although may be limited to accommodate state's or child's compelling needs);
see also Privor, supra note 41, at 449-50 (urging that State authority to impose limits on
juvenile behavior devolves from parent's inherent right to do so); Barbara Frazier, How to
Make Rules and Give Commands, THE SUCCESSFUL PARENT,
http://www.thesuccessfulparent.com/articles/discipline.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2006)
(opining that it is parents' unique role to set clear guidelines and model behavior in order
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Often, when children exhibit good behavior and maturity,
parents extend their children's curfew and allow them more
freedom. 272 This method of disciplining and rewarding children is
an important and commonly used parental tool. 2 73 When the
Hutchins court concluded that it was not within a parent's right
to set a curfew, it effectively concluded that a parent could not
utilize an important tool for raising her child.274 Several courts
have found that curfews implicate the parents' fundamental right
to raise their children and have invalidated such curfews as a
result.275 For example, in McCollester v. Keene,276 the court
determined that the juvenile curfew ordinance did not aid
parents in their supervisory roles and that it even undermined
the parents' rights to raise their children. 277 A fundamental right
of the parents was involved, and, for this reason, the Hutchins
court should have analyzed the case asking whether such right
was violated. 278
to develop value system in their children); KidsHealth, Disciplining your Child,
http://kidshealth.
org/parent/emotions/behavior/discipline.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2006) (discussing
methods of parental discipline).
272 See Frazier, supra note 271 (suggesting that parents write out a list of the rules
that they would like their children to follow); see also KidsHealth, supra note 271
(positing that effective parenting tool is to focus on positive, treating good behavior with
such rewards as extended curfew).
273 See Frazier, supra note 271 (highlighting punishment and reward as two
fundamental parenting tools); see also KidsHealth, supra note 271 (noting that the
rewarding and retracting of privileges is one of the most commonly employed parenting
techniques); Psychologist Offers
Do's and Don't[s] for Using 'Time Out' to Discipline Children, 24 YALE BULL. & CALENDAR
34 (July - Aug. 1996), available at http://www.yale.edu/opa/ybclv24.n34.news.12.html
(observing that positive reinforcement by rewarding good behaviors with certain
privileges is an "effective method for teaching good behavior").
274 See Privor, supra note 41, at 450 (suggesting that states, by adopting paternalistic
role, may actually be functioning in opposition to authoritative parental role); see also
Margaret Brooke Cobey, Teenage Curfew Laws: Beneficial or Detrimental?,
http://gcclearn.gcc.cc.va.us/writing/12.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2006) (hypothesizing that
"curfew laws interfere with the rights of parents to set limits for their children and...
[take] away the responsibility of parents to supervise their own children").
275 See McCollester v. City of Keene, 586 F. Supp. 1381, 1384 (D. N.H. 1984) (finding
curfew statute unconstitutional "as it impermissibly curtail[ed] the liberty and privacy
rights guaranteed to juveniles and parents by the Fourteenth Amendment"); see also
Allen v. City of Bordentown, 524 A.2d 478, 486-87 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1987)
(determining town's curfew ordinance interfered with both child's and parents' First
Amendment rights).
276 586 F. Supp. 1381 (D. N.H. 1984).
277 See id. at 1386.
278 See Allen, 524 A.2d at 486 (suggesting need for higher level of scrutiny when
dealing with fundamental rights); see also Daniel E. Hall, Curfews, Culture, and Custom
in American Samoa: An Analytical Map for Applying the U.S. Constitution to U.S.
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C. The Level of Scrutiny
The most important legal issue and one that Hutchins
completely misconstrued is what level of scrutiny the court
should apply. This is the most important issue because the
questions of who has the burden of proof and how closely the law
should be evaluated are contingent upon the level applied. 279
There were several problems with the Hutchins court's
evaluation of the statute. First, the Hutchins court never clearly
defined what level of scrutiny it applied.280 Some believe that the
rational basis level of scrutiny was applied while others believe
that an intermediate level of scrutiny was used.281 The only thing
that is clear from the opinion is that strict scrutiny was not
used. 282 Second, assuming that an intermediate level of scrutiny
was applied, the court incorrectly applied the test. Although the
Hutchins court was correct in finding that the protection of its
citizens was an important interest,283 the court incorrectly
analyzed whether the curfew was substantially related to that
interest. 284 Instead of placing the burden on the government to
prove that the law was substantially related, it appears that the
Appellees were under such burden. 285 The Appellees argued that
the government data on juvenile crime was incorrect. 286 The
court reasoned that the data did not have to be an exact fit and
Territories, 2 ASLAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 69, 104 (2001) (discussing Hutchins court's
assumption that even if curfew did tread upon parents' fundamental rights, it would
nonetheless survive standard of heightened scrutiny).
279 See supra text accompanying notes 107-22 for analysis of the different levels of
scrutiny and burdens of proof involved. See also Ramos v. Town of Vernon, for a brief
explanation of how the challenger shoulders the burden of proof where a rational basis
applies, whereas the government does so in the case of strict scrutiny. 353 F.3d 171, 175
(2d Cir. 2003).
280 See Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531, 541 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (en banc)
(plurality opinion) (discussing court's scrutiny selection); see also Chudy, supra note 8, at
541 (recognizing immense confusion as to appropriate level of scrutiny applied in
Hutchins).
281 See Chudy, supra note 8, at 541 (summarizing various Hutchins opinions); see also
Benjamin C. Sasse, Curfew Laws, Freedom of Movement, and the Rights of Juveniles, 50
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 681, 726 (2000) (discussing Hutchins court's reliance on other cities'
evidence in order to determine compliance with substantial relation requirement).
282 See Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 541 (rejecting district court's use of strict scrutiny).
283 See id. at 541-42 (asserting importance of minors' protection).
284 See id. at 553 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (arguing that court's analysis failed to
conform to intermediate scrutiny review).





concluded that the data was not flawed.287 Instead of making the
government prove that the data showed a substantial
relationship, the Appellees were obligated to prove that it was
not substantially related. 288 Finally, when analyzing the parents'
rights, the court used an intermediate level of review. 289 The
original reason for using an intermediate level was that the court
noted that minors were less mature than adults.290 However, the
court was no longer dealing with the minors' right of intrastate
travel. Instead the court was dealing with the parents' right to
raise their children and a stricter level of scrutiny should have
been applied.
D. Recommendations and Conclusions regarding Hutchins
The Hutchins court's reasoning was flawed and it should have
followed prior case law.291 The court should not have narrowly
interpreted the minors' right as the right to be on the street at
night unsupervised.292 Instead, the court should have construed
the right to be the right to intrastate travel.293 This narrow
interpretation went in a very different direction than prior case
law, and, as stated earlier, makes it seem that minors' rights
change depending on what time of day it is. More importantly,
this narrow construction makes it very difficult for the court to
properly inquire into the challenged law.2 94 Furthermore, the
287 See id.
288 See id. at 542-44.
289 See id. at 545.
290 See id. at 541.
291 See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983) (recognizing constitutional right
to freedom of movement); see also Ramos v. Town of Vernon, 353 F. 3d 171, 176-77 (2d
Cir. 2003) (reasoning that Hutchins defined interest of minors too narrowly, which
ultimately led court to deem that constitutional right relevant to minors' interest did not
exist); King v. New Rochelle Mun. Hous. Auth., 442 F.2d 646, 647 (2d Cir. 1971) (noting
that right to intrastate travel is fundamental personal right).
292 See Ramos, 353 F.3d at 177 (explaining Hutchins approach is too narrow insofar
as it permits finding of right to move in daylight, which disappears at nightfall); see also
King, 442 F.2d at 648 (adopting broad rather than narrow view of constitutional right to
free movement).
293 See supra text accompanying note 291.
294 See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 213-14 (1975) (discussing the
infringement upon the rights of minors as justifiable given the status of minors, but
nonetheless recognizing that the Court must treat First Amendment rights as no less
applicable to minors than they are to adults); see also Ramos, 353 F.3d at 178 (stating
that denying existence of constitutional right, which results from narrow construction, is
"too blunt an instrument" to resolve question of juvenile rights to intrastate travel).
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court's failure to explain what level of scrutiny was applied only
makes it more difficult for lower courts and communities to apply
its rationale. 295 At the very least, the court should have explicitly
stated which level of scrutiny to apply to avoid any confusion and
create a framework for lower courts to follow.
E. Do the Curfews Work?
Even if the Hutchins court was not flawed in its reasoning, the
curfews that communities implement do not work. 296 Studies
indicate that juvenile curfews do not protect society from juvenile
crime.297 More specifically, they state that the curfews do not
work because (1) most crime happens during non-curfew hours,
(2) juveniles who do not fear getting caught for a crime will not
fear violating juvenile curfew laws, (3) the statutes assume that a
child's home life is a safe and better place to be, and (4) the
statutes assume there will not be repeat offenders. 298 In a study
conducted in California, comparing those communities that
implemented a curfew with those that did not, it was found that
295 See Juvenile Curfews and the Major Confusion, supra note 1, at 2421 (explaining
how circuits remain "undeniably split" on the issue of juvenile curfews and on the issue of
what standard of review should be used to evaluate the constitutionality of juvenile
curfews); see also LaCava, supra note 3, at 1237 (noting that courts are split on almost
every aspect of juvenile curfew cases, and because of this, precedent will be difficult to
apply until the Supreme Court rules definitively on these issues).
296 See Sheila Bedi, [Your Turn] Youth Curfew A Bad Idea, JACKSON FREE PRESS
(Aug. 2, 2006), available at
http://www.jacksonfreepress.comlcomments.php?id=10321__7_0_C (stating that National
Council on Crime and Delinquency found that curfew enforcement is ineffective at
reducing crime and unnecessarily funnels innocent youth into criminal justice system);
see also Kathleen Sullivan, City Plans to Enforce Its Curfew For Youth, SAN FRAN. CHRON.
(Oct. 26, 2005), available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
binlarticle.cgi?f=/c/a12005/1O/26/BAGGAFE3LJ1.DTL (noting that expert research has
shown juvenile curfews have only negligible effect).
297 See Adams, supra note 6, at 146-47 (recounting results of various studies which
ultimately supported conclusion that youth curfews have little to no positive crime
deterring effects); see also Bedi, supra note 296 (discussing curfews' failure to lower youth
crime rates).
298 See Adams, supra note 6, at 154 (describing factors that are not considered in
formulating juvenile curfews, including fact that not every child has responsible parents
and a safe home and that some offenders are not deterred by curfew laws and are, in fact,
repeat offenders); see also LaCava, supra note 3, at 1209 (noting "disconnect" between
problem hours and curfew hours); Sullivan, supra note 296 (stating juvenile crime is most
prevalent in afternoon while children are unsupervised rather than at night during
curfew hours).
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"curfews have [no] appreciable effect on juvenile crime."299
Furthermore, in data cited by the City of San Diego in 1995 in
support of a juvenile curfew ordinance, violent crime was
virtually unchanged since the implementation of a curfew. 300
While in 1994 there were 233 arrests, in 1995, at least one year
after the curfew's implementation, there were 222 arrests.301
CONCLUSION
Juvenile curfew ordinances raise issues regarding the
important rights of both minors and parents. When dealing with
important rights such as the right to intrastate travel and
parents' fundamental right to raise their children, a court should
not narrowly construe those rights, graze over the selected level
of scrutiny, and conclude that such law is valid even though
there are studies that most juvenile crimes happen during non-
curfew hours and are not effective. Although juvenile curfews
are popular and many communities have them, the curfews do
involve fundamental rights. As long as there is proof that such
curfews do not effectively protect communities, society is, in
essence, giving up rights not for security but merely to allow the
government to set the limits for its children.
299 Jordan C. Budd, Juvenile Curfews: The Rights of Minors vs. The Rhetoric of Public
Safety, A.B.A. SECTION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, available at
http://www.abanet.
org/irr/hr/fall99humanrightsbudd.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2006).
300 Budd, supra note 299.
301 Id.
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